Well, thank you very much, Chairman

Menendez and Senator Corker and members of the committee, for

inviting me to testify today on United States policy toward North

Korea or, as it is also known, the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea.

North Korea’s February 12 announcement of its third nuclear

test and its subsequent threats to conduct even more follow-on

measures are only the latest in a long line of reminders that the

DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and proliferation

activities pose serious threats to U.S. national security,

to regional security in the Asia-Pacific, and to the global nonproliferation

regime.

Pyongyang continues to violate its international obligations and

commitments, including to denuclearize. Its human rights record

remains deplorable. Its economy is stagnant. Its people are impoverished.

It pours significant sums into nuclear and ballistic missile

programs that are forbidden by the United Nations.

The DPRK has consistently failed to take advantage of the alternatives

available. The United States has offered Pyongyang an

improved relationship, provided North Korea demonstrates a willingness

to fulfill its denuclearization commitments and address

other concerns. The DPRK rebuffed these offers and instead responded

with a series of provocations that drew widespread international

condemnation.

North Korea again brazenly defied the international community

on April 13, 2012, and again on December 12, 2012, with longrange

missile launches, in flagrant violation of U.N. Security Council

resolutions and in the face of united calls from the international

community to desist. Some 60 countries and international organizations

issued statements criticizing the December launch.

The DPRK’s February 12 announcement of a nuclear test, which

Pyongyang proclaimed was targeted against the United States of

America, represents an even bolder threat to national security, the

stability of the regime, and the global nonproliferation regime. The

international response has been unprecedented. Over 80 countries

and international organizations from all corners of the world have

condemned the tests.

We are working with the international community to make clear

that North Korea’s nuclear test has costly consequences. In adopting

Resolution 2087 in January after the December launch, the

U.N. Security Council pledged to take significant action in the

event of a nuclear test. We are working hard at the United Nations

Security Council to make good on that pledge, and as you noted,

Mr. Chairman, that is occurring even as we speak and we are hoping

that the council adopts the resolution that the United States

put forward. The Security Council will deliver a credible and strong

response that further impedes the growth of North Korea’s nuclear

weapons and ballistic missiles program and its ability to engage in

proliferation activities.

The resolution today that we tabled builds upon, strengthens,

and significantly expands the scope of the strong U.N. sanctions

already in place. The sanctions contained in this draft resolution

will significantly impede North Korea’s ability to proceed in developing

its nuclear and missile programs and significantly expand

the scope of the tools the United Nations has available to counter

these North Korean developments.

We are also strengthening our close coordination with our sixparty

partners and our regional allies, and through a whole-ofgovernment

approach, working closely with our partners in the

Department of Defense and other agencies, we will take the steps

necessary to defend ourselves and our allies, particularly the

Republic of Korea and Japan.

Effective, targeted multilateral and national sanctions will

remain a vital component of our effort to impede the DPRK from

advancing its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and

its proliferation activities. We continue to exercise national authorities

to sanction North Korean entities, individuals, and those that

support them in facilitating programs that threaten the American

people. Most recently on January 24, the Departments of State and

the Treasury designated a number of North Korean individuals and

entities under Executive Order 13–382, which targets actors

involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and

their supporters. We will continue to take national measures as

appropriate.

Sanctions are not a punitive measure, but rather a tool to impede

the development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs

and its proliferation-related exports, as well as to make clear the

costs of North Korea’s defiance of its international obligations, and

working toward our end game will require an openness to meaningful

dialogue with the DPRK.

We remain committed to authentic and credible negotiations to

implement the September 2005 joint statement of the six-party

talks and to bring North Korea into compliance with its international

obligations through irreversible steps leading to denuclearization.

The United States will not engage in talks for talks’ sake.

Authentic and credible talks will first require a serious, meaningful

change in North Korea’s priorities, demanding that Pyongyang is

prepared to meet its commitments and obligations on denuclearization.

This leads to a few important other principles. First and foremost,

the United States will not accept North Korea as a nucleararmed

state. We will not reward the DPRK for the absence of bad

behavior. We will not compensate the DPRK merely for returning

to dialogue. We will not tolerate North Korea provoking its neighbors.

We have made clear that U.S.-DPRK relations cannot fundamentally

improve without sustained improvement in inter-

Korean relations and in human rights. These positions will not

change.

In the meantime, active United States diplomacy on North Korea

on a wide range of issues continues. Close coordination with our

valued treaty allies, the ROK and Japan, remain absolutely central

to our approach.

We have also expanded our engagement by developing new dialogues

on North Korea with key global actors who have joined the

rising chorus of voices calling on the DPRK to comply with its

international obligations.

China, however, does remain central to altering North Korea’s

cost calculus and close United States-China consultations on North

Korea will remain for us a key focus of diplomatic efforts in the

weeks and months ahead.

While denuclearization remains an essential goal of United

States policy, so too does the welfare of North Korea’s nearly 25

million people, the vast majority of whom bear the brunt of the

government’s decision to perpetuate an unsustainable, self-impoverishing,

military-first policy. Improving human rights conditions is

an integral part of our overall North Korea policy, and how the

DPRK addresses human rights will have a significant impact on

prospects for improved U.S.-DPRK ties.

The entire world is increasingly taking note of the grave, widespread,

and systematic human rights violations in the DPRK and

demanding action. The United Nations High Commissioner for

Human Rights Navi Pillay has called for an in-depth international

inquiry to document abuses. We support this call, and next week,

my colleague, Special Envoy for North Korea Human Rights Issues

Robert King, will travel to Geneva to attend the United Nations

Human Rights Council’s 22nd session where he will call attention

to North Korea’s human rights record and urge adoption of an

enhanced mechanism of inquiry into the regime’s abuses against

the North Korean people.

Mr. Chairman, the Obama administration’s dual-track policy of

engagement and pressure toward the DPRK reflects a bipartisan

recognition that only a policy of openness to dialogue when possible,

combined with sustained, robust pressure through sanctions

when necessary, can maximize prospects for progress in denuclearizing

North Korea.

But genuine progress requires a fundamental shift in North Korea’s

strategic calculus. The DPRK leadership must choose between

provocation or peace, isolation or integration. North Korea will not

achieve security, economic prosperity, and integration into the

international community while it pursues nuclear weapons, while

it threatens its neighbors, while it tramples on international

norms, abuses its own people, and refuses to fulfill its longstanding

obligations and commitments.

The DPRK leadership in Pyongyang faces increasingly sharp

choices, and we are working with our friends and allies to further

sharpen these choices. If the North Korean regime is at all wise,

it will reembark on a path to denuclearization for the benefit of the

North Korean people, the Northeast Asian region, and the world.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this chance to appear before

you today, and I am happy to try and address any questions you

may have. Thank you, sir.

Yes. Well, you have asked probably the biggest

question that can be asked about North Korea policy, and I

think you are hitting on key themes here.

Changing North Korea’s calculus is proving to be a challenge.

Administrations of both stripes have been at this at least since

Ronald Reagan was President and one can argue even before that.

What we are attempting to do is continue to present a united

front in terms of, if you will, concentric circles beginning with our

allies in the region, extending out to our partners in the six-party

process, China and Russia, and then, going beyond that, to try to

build an international coalition that understands the threat that

North Korea poses to the international system, not just on nonproliferation,

but on human rights, how it comports itself in the

international financial system, and so forth. North Korea appears

not yet to be absorbing those lessons, but we will continue to certainly

sharpen them working with our colleagues and with our

friends.

At a more basic level, we are working very closely, as we have

for decades, with our South Korean ally to ensure that should

North Korea miscalculate—and we call on them not to do that once

again in the face of these new threats emerging from Pyongyang

even in recent hours and days. We work with the South Koreans

to make sure that we are ready from an alliance standpoint militarily

to deal with any threats that arise. So that is very much at

the macrolevel, if you will, how we are dealing with this problem.

You mentioned China. You are absolutely right about China.

China is a critical piece of this challenge. They are North Korea’s

closest neighbor. They are often North Korea’s protector. They are

certainly an ally of North Korea. They have had a special relation-

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ship of sorts for quite a while. So we are concentrating a lot of diplomatic

energy and effort on deepening our dialogue with China to

present to them the proposition that there is still a peaceful, diplomatic

way forward to deal with the North Korea issue. However,

it will not work and cannot work unless China steps up, plays its

full role in bringing home to Pyongyang the choices it faces and

setting the table, if you will, for any return to negotiations.

I am afraid that the history of trying to draw North Korea into

talks that can deal with its nuclear program, its missile program,

and all of the other issues that we are concerned about has not

been a fully successful one because the North Koreans have often

been able to split us.

We think it is time to work more closely with China but also, of

course, with our close allies and other partners in the six-party

process to bring home to North Korea the choices it faces and to

try to direct them——

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try to direct them——

Sure. I think the safest thing to say about

the Chinese calculus is it is evolving. I mean, yesterday we were

greeted with the news, somewhat stunningly, that Chairman Mao’s

grandson, who was a general in the Peoples Liberation Army,

called on North Korea to move forward on denuclearization. So

there are some stunning developments occurring within China. One

could almost describe it as the beginnings of a debate about how

China will deal with its neighbor. Relations have not always gone

smoothly of late between the two countries.

Now, I do not think it is up to us to try to figure out how to engage

too deeply in that internal dialogue in China, but I think

those are very helpful signs.

You are right. China is always the ‘‘get out of jail free’’ card for

North Korea. They can always provide ways for the North Koreans

to export materials, import materials, should they wish.

China, however, is part of the Security Council. I have just been

given a note that the resolution has passed. The Chinese played a

big role in crafting that resolution. It contains lots of new provisions

that we could talk about.

So I think that there are signs that China is beginning to step

up even more robustly to play its role. They say that they enforce

these sanctions. We take them at their word. We trust but verify

on that front and will continue to engage the Chinese to deepen our

dialogue and to ensure that the Chinese do the maximum amount

they can to deal with this problem.

Well, I think it has to be a combination of

all of the above plus more. I mean, I think we need to continue to

press North Korea when necessary, and right now it is necessary

to do that because they are in a provocation’s phase. And so, therefore,

you are getting the reaction from the U.N. Security Council.

So I think pressure through sanctions is important.

I also think we need to stay strong in our alliance with the ROK,

present a united front there, continue to sharpen and deepen our

capabilities.

I also think it is important to continue to build this international

coalition. I mean, 80 nations is somewhat stunning. You have got

nations like South Africa, Brazil, even Communist nations like

Laos and Vietnam, issuing statements condemning this most recent

nuclear test. So the Greek chorus out there in the world is growing

in volume.

And you are right. That is only good as far as it goes because

what is most important is to change North Korea’s calculus. So,

therefore, we need to also be ready to engage North Korea in credible

and authentic talks, if we can ever see that they are prepared

to take real steps to denuclearize and to address our concerns. I

think all of those things are exceedingly important.

And I think also, very quickly, we need to take account of what

we have achieved over the last 60 years. We have worked with

South Korea and helped them create a bit of an economic miracle.

I think the ratio is now 36 to 1 in terms of the amount of goods

and services produced per capita by the average South Korean as

against the average North Korean. So things are not going well

from the standpoint of the correlation of forces when it comes to

North Korea right now.

So I think we move on all these fronts diplomatically, militarily,

in terms of the international coalition. I think we need to keep

drawing attention to their human rights, and I think by continuing

to press them and continuing to present to them the opportunity,

should they choose to accept it, to come talk to the international

community and find a different way forward, away from provocations,

away from bluster, away from threats, and move toward a

different future that is absolutely available for them, I am at least

guardedly optimistic that at some point they will see that is the

way to go. And I think that is why we need to stay true to our principles

and keep that pressure on.

I mean, to be fair, I work for the State

Department, and that is a question ultimately for our Defense

Department and defense planners, but I can take a bit of a stab

at it.

I will take a short stab.

I have not seen in my frequent travels in Japan and the ROK

that there are really deep concerns that our commitment to them

is at all in jeopardy, and I think because we have begun what is

called popularly the ‘‘pivot to Asia,’’ we have begun to devote even

more resources to the Asian theater, and I think that has gone, to

a great extent, to reassure them.

Well, some of the sanctions that have been

part of the now many resolutions that have been passed get at this.

I think it is important that we remain vigilant.

Sure.

Well, I think we are slowing it, and I think

that that is good because it makes it more difficult for the North

Koreans to gain the inputs they need for their WMD program. I

think it is important, though, in a kind of a, you know, all-aspects

policy to look at that. That is something we continue to work on.

It is interesting. I will be quick here. If you look at the trend

over a period of years, there was a time not so many years ago

when these problems with supernotes, with methamphetamine

exports, with the counterfeiting of cigarettes and drugs—this was

really epidemic. I am not saying it is not still a problem. It is and

we are very vigilant about it. But a lot of the steps that were taken

by the international community led by the United States, I think,

did a good job of making it much more difficult for them to do that.

A lot more work to do. No question about it. I think you are right.

It ought to be a focus of attention.

Thank you, sir.

A great question and it is a subject of a lot

of debate among some highly qualified experts in the government

and then among the expert community beyond, people like Dr. Sig

Hecker out at Stanford who have tremendous expertise here.

Absolutely. Yes, he is a good friend. He is

a national treasure. That is exactly right.

What I am going to have to do is take a dive on this one, sir,

because you are asking a question that really does go deeply into

intelligence matters. I love the lights of cameras, but I think with

all that attention, I would really rather not get into what I know.

And I have to be honest that I am not an expert on these matters.

So I think, though, as a general proposition, a lot of what is written

in the popular literature about this by the think tanks and others

is not too far off in terms of the estimates, some of which you

have alluded to.

But I am sorry. I cannot get into those highly classified intelligence

matters.

Yes, a great question. And that is right. It

is in our interests to do that, but it is a tough target set to convince

the North Koreans to open up. While we were not crazy about the

timing of the Richardson-Schmidt trip to Pyongyang, I was pleased

to see Eric Schmidt make those statements. I think that was a very

important challenge that he kind of laid down to the North

Koreans.

Funny things are happening in North Korea. Interesting things

are happening in North Korea that could eventually have an effect.

You have 1.5 million cell phones now mostly among the elite and

on a closed system, so huge limits there. They are not able to access

the outside. But nonetheless, it promotes the spread of information

within North Korea.

We know from lots of good studies that have been done by private

organizations interviewing these 23,000 North Korean refugees

who found their way to South Korea, that there is a surprising

degree of understanding and knowledge in North Korea about the

world outside their borders. South Korean soap operas are popular,

and it probably is a bit of a shock to North Koreans when they get

a thumb drive and they stick it in their machine and they watch

one of these to see South Koreans with one and two cars in their

garages and flat screen TVs and all the rest. So I think that the

media picture in North Korea is changing. That is important. That

is happening organically because of the trade between China and

North Korea.

And I think we do need to look at entrepreneurial ways to promote

more of that, get more information in. I think broadcasting

is a big part of that. The Broadcasting Board of Governors spends

a lot of time on this issue. We work with the ROK on that as well.

We work with private groups. There are a number of NGOs, a

number of evangelical organizations, and others who work hard to

try to alleviate the challenges faced by average North Koreans, and

their presence in the country I think is a great way to bring to the

North Koreans an image of what Americans and the outside world

are like.

So I think across all of these fronts, there is much that is happening.

There is much more to do. And I am very glad you raised

it.

It is still the goal of United States policy to

achieve a Korean Peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons. The

United States a generation ago removed our few short-range weapons

that we had there.

We know this is not going to happen overnight even if we are

able to get some sort of a diplomatic process started. I was personally

engaged in following up the tremendous work that Ambassador

Steve Bosworth did before he left my position to try to draw out

the North Koreans to begin a process where we could go down that

road and get them to, first of all, bound their nuclear program and

eventually give them up.

I think there is still a chance for diplomacy. There is still a

chance for the six-party talks to work, but it will require a united

front on the part of all of us who are part of it. And most of all,

it will require a change of calculus in Pyongyang, and that is what

we are working to. But I am hopeful we can get to that future. I

am hopeful that within a generation or so we could see a very different

picture on the peninsula, and that is what we are working

toward.

Yes, but he gave up the baseline. That was

the problem.

Thanks so much. And let me just quickly—

I mean, I do not disagree with anything you have said. This is one

of the hardest foreign policy problems out there and not just for

this particular administration but for many predecessor administrations.

So you are right about all that.

Everything you prescribe I think is being done in one form or

another: delaying their acquisition of these materials, working

hard—and here Ambassador Joseph I think will have more to

say—to prevent them from proliferating these technologies, never

letting people forget the nature of this regime and what it is they

have done to their own people, what it is they are doing to the

international system by remaining an outlier.

And you talk about creating conditions for unification.

I think here you are right. What we need to do is continue to

support the Republic of Korea.

What the ROK has done over the last couple of generations is

nothing short of a miracle in terms of the way it has pulled itself

up by its bootstraps, created the 11th-largest economy in the world,

become a much, much more stronger nation. And I think we need

to do all of this, and we certainly need to work more closely every

day with the ROK and its new President, President Park Geunhye,

to present this united front to North Korea and to do that also

more broadly.

Within hours of their nuclear test, all of the other five parties,

China and Russia included, issued statements denouncing what

they had done.

So I agree with you.

Well, you know, we might be. They are

clearly not pleased in Beijing that every time they have tried to impress

upon the North Koreans that they should take a different

path, North Korea thumbs their nose at them. And we have seen

stunning developments, articles appearing in the press that have

to have been done with the knowledge of the central authorities.

I mentioned Chairman Mao’s grandson speaking out on this issue.

You have got the Chinese blogosphere and netizens in China who,

after Fukushima Daiichi, are saying what goes here. There is a

nuclear test right across the border with North Korea. This country

is still testing nuclear weapons 15 years after the last country

tested a weapon. So things are changing in China.

What does it all mean? Where is it all headed? Will it create a

fundamental shift in their strategic calculus? Very, very hard to

say, but we are watching it closely.

Great questions. Let me be quick about

that.

The hotline cutoff. They have done this before. It is one of the

things they do on occasion. I do not know that it is necessarily the

case that this latest threat to cut off the hotline—or perhaps they

have already cut the line—is going to be, at the end of the day,

much different from what we have seen in the past. Nonetheless,

it is serious.

Yes. At the Peace Village on the border, it

has often been used to convey messages back and forth.

Your question about what is happening in Geneva and the likely,

we hope, establishment for the first time of a permanent mechanism,

a commission of inquiry, to look at North Korean human

rights, I think this is a significant development. It is somewhat

stunning that this has not been the case in the past. But anyway,

the United Nations is, we hope, going to take that step. And I

think that it is not a magic bullet, but I think it will be a great

way for the entire international community institutionally and

indefinitely to look at what is going on in North Korea and to

broadcast to the rest of the world the results of their efforts.

On NGOs——

Well, it is not done yet. The Human Rights

Council has not looked at it. And having served a couple of years

in Vienna working in the U.N. system, I know nothing is done until

it is done in U.N.-land. So we will see.

But we have reason to believe that there is the right kind of

correlation of forces. The European Union is behind this. Japan is

behind it. The ROK has just announced their support for this

mechanism. We are actively seeking it. And of course, I had

mentioned in my statement that U.N. officials are behind it and

promoting it. So I think the planets are lining up. It is going to

happen, I hope. And we are going to do what we can to make it

happen. And it will have an effect.

On NGOs, that is a great point. Yesterday during the snow day

that wasn’t, I was in the office and I was on a wonderful conference

call with about seven NGOs, Mercy Corps, GRS, many of them religiously

based. These people do heroic work in North Korea. And it

is very unsung. They get in there. They do medical programs. They

get out of Pyongyang, that walled city where the elite lives, and

they get into the countryside and they do everything from tuberculosis

work to digging wells to helping hospitals and dental clinics.

You name it. And I think it is important that we do everything

we can to kind of clear the path for them to do what they can do.

It is not easy. And one of the concerns they had was about sanctions

and whether sanctions will affect their ability to bring things

into North Korea to do the work they have got to do.

I think we need to try to find a way—and there is a bit of a

carve-out in the language of the resolution—to promote their work

because I think that is exceedingly important that this kind of people-

to-people work go forward. Why? Because one-third of North

Koreans, according to a number of studies, are severely, chronically

malnourished. They are clearly forgotten by the elites who live in

Pyongyang building amusement parks and holding rock concerts

and so forth. And so it is very, very important that we do what we

can to work with them.

Well, the NGOs take it very seriously. They

have got decades of experience. They are very good about it. A lot

of their work is scaled such that it is a lot less likely that the

regime is going to try to divert the resources that they provide, the

services to the military or the elites. I have been impressed as I

have looked at the specifics of these programs that they have

underway. They have, to a great extent, figured out how to do this,

and whether it is flood relief or whether it is bringing nutritional

supplements to malnourished children, they are one of the ways we

ought to go. And when we have done big feeding programs in North

Korea—there was the 500,000 metric ton program under the previous

administration that the North Koreans cut off only about a

third of the way into it. And this most recent one we tried to put

in place—we do most of that work through U.S. NGOs because

they are that good and they have the right understanding of how

to ensure that the goods and services they provide get to the people

who need them.

Absolutely. Thank you, sir.

Well, that is a really hard target. A lot of

terrific intelligence professionals work at that. We stay in close

touch with our European allies, some of whom have small embassies

there. I just, a week ago, spent a couple of hours with the

ambassador of one of those nations who had lots of insights to provide

about the thinking of the government.

Just as a general matter, I think what has happened was, you

know, Kim Jong-un came into power the beginning of last year on

the death of his father in mid-December in 2011. There was then

this period that lasted a few months where everybody was saying,

oh, this may be a new day. He is a young Gorbachev. One think

tanker even talked about a Camelot moment occurring in North

Korea. I personally was not buying any of this stuff at the time,

nor were many in Government. But what we have seen is that that

debate has gone away, that the hope for the kind of a more enlightened

approach to these issues—that is fading fast.

I think he has consolidated his power. He has now got the six

key titles. He is the head of the army, head of the military, head

of the government. And remember, the logic of their system is

such—it is such a strictly hierarchical, dictatorial, top-down system

that in order for that system to operate as it has for the last three

generations, there has to be a man at the top to whom all issues

are referred and from whom all wisdom flows. So we think that he

is, for all intents and purposes, in charge.

And as to why he has taken the steps he has taken, some of the

purges, I think some of that has been consolidating his power, firing

the generals and so forth, and then all of this tough talk going

on—it is hard to say why they are doing that. I think a lot of it

is just their classical reaction to the fact that the international

community increasingly is coming together and making it tougher

for them operate. So I think that is the kind of acting out that we

often see from North Korea.

Yes, but on sanctions I think what is important—

the most important sanctions often tend to be the ones that

have the buy-in of the broadest number of nations. And here I

talked about the role of China and the importance of working with

them to ensure that they follow through on their commitments

when it comes to sanctions.

What is the most effective set of sanctions? That is hard to say.

You know, I am tempted to say that probably the sanctions that

have helped to cut off the flow of luxury goods is pretty important

because it has prevented the regime, to some extent—they find

ways around it, but of rewarding members of the elite.

But I think a more serious answer is that the sanctions that are

getting at the nuclear program, getting at the missile program, preventing

the inputs from going into North Korea that they need in

order to build up those weapons of mass destruction programs,

those are the most important.

This latest resolution that I was given a note that has passed in

New York contains not only a tightening of the existing sanctions

but it has got some new sanctions in it that get at that problem.

And I think we need to keep building on that. I think what you

will see is that there will then be national sanctions that will be

promulgated by not just us but others in order to tighten sanctions

down further.

But I think it is in the missile and nuclear areas where the sanctions

are having the most effect and then finally, interdiction which

is to say—and this new resolution has a lot of good stuff in it about

preventing the export by North Korea of its armaments, which is

a key source of income, by sea and by air. And there is a lot in this

resolution that gets at that, and I think that is what we need to

keep working on first and foremost.

We have done a number of financial sanctions

that are more in this particular resolution approved just minutes

ago. There are individual designations of key people and their

apparatus who play key roles in exporting their materials, importing

what they need to build up their programs, travel bans on

these individuals, and so forth. So it is a combination of these individual

designations, institutional designations, and then also the

specific inputs, the actual machinery and technology that they

need. And I think we just need to push on all of these fronts and

keep it up.

Well, I think the movement—it is a little bit

like, I have to admit, watching paint dry sometimes. It is such a

long process. But I think the movement has been incremental. I

think the movement has been all of the various efforts, and there

have been really quite a variety of approaches to this problem by

various administrations in the past whether engagement, whether

pressure, different architectures internationally, six-party talks.

There were four-party talks at one point, and here Ambassador

Bosworth can speak to a great deal of this. I think the biggest

change has been just the steady accumulation of experience, of

pressure, of sanctions over the years, over the decades, and I think

that has made a huge difference.

And then the final thing I will say is that, you know, the world

is beginning to wake up to a greater extent to this problem. It is

still kind of stunning, as a diplomat, that 80 nations from every

corner of the world would issue statements condemning North

Korea’s nuclear test. These are developments we would not have

seen even a few years ago. So this coalition is building. It is growing.

It is strengthening, and it is meaningful because these are people

who send messages to North Korea. They send messages to

China. And it is very difficult in an international system for a

nation like North Korea to ignore the fact that increasingly their

actions are seen as deleterious to the functioning of the world system

and to the interests of these countries.

So it is hard for me to point to one particular recalibration that

has occurred. Maybe what is going on in China will fit that bill.

But I would just say that it is this incremental deepening and

broadening of pressure on North Korea that has been most important.

Yes. Well, the economy question is a great

one, and there are a number of experts who look at this hard. It

is tough to measure. They do not produce statistics that are at all

reliable to indicate the scope of it.

Many people are fooled when they go to Pyongyang which, as I

have said, is a bit of a walled city state. You cannot easily get in

and get out where the elites live, and they see people with cell

phones and they see a few more cars on the street, a few more restaurants,

and they conclude that North Korea is really coming up

in the world economically. I do not think that is the case.

They have some goods and services to offer to the world. They

have mineral deposits that are of value certainly to China which

seeks to exploit them and others. They export laborers to Russia

and China and other places around the world who remit moneys

to North Korea. Their economy in some sectors has done reasonably

well.

But the problem, of course, is that their agriculture sector

remains unreformed; their light industrial sector, the same. When

the new leader came in, he made a number of promises about—

hinted at reforms that he would institute. We have yet to see that.

For whatever reason, he seems to have drawn back from going forward

with those reforms. To some extent, reform of the North

Korean economy would be good for the North Korean people, and

the Chinese are often telling us that we should help the North

Koreans reform their economy and we beg to differ on that.

And I am sorry. Your second question, sir?

Sure.

Yes. I think the latter is the case.

We do not link food assistance to political matters. What I found,

when I came into the process toward the end of our yearlong effort

to negotiate this deal with the North Koreans, was that the North

Koreans were insisting that the offer we had made of 240,000 metric

tons be linked to the concessions they were going to make on

nuclear and missiles. So they enforced that linkage from their side.

We do not use food as a weapon or a tool and we do not link it

to political matters.

And no country has been more generous than the United States

over the years in providing food to the North Korean people I think

since 1989, if I have the statistic right or 1997. It has been on the

order of some $800 million of food, almost 2 million metric tons. So

we support the people of North Korea. We try—and it is not easy—

to bring them aid and comfort, bring them food because it is quite

clear that the authorities in Pyongyang do not care about what

happens in the hinterland of North Korea, and they allow this malnutrition

and sometimes, as was the case in the 1990s, starvation

to occur.

So we do not link the two. I would never posit or put forward

that food aid is something we should use as an inducement to political

change or change on denuclearization.

Well, I mean, the last thing I will do is

speak for the Chinese on this. But there are signs that the Chinese

are watching closely these debates that are occurring, in particular

in Japan and the ROK among some. I do not think any consensus

is developing or will develop in favor of going forward with developing

nuclear weapons. I certainly hope not because it is important

from the standpoint of the integrity of the Nonproliferation Treaty

that they not go forward in doing that. But the Chinese are taking

notice and I think it concerns them.

You know, one of the things that we say to them when we have

these conversations about what is happening in North Korea is if

you have concerns about America’s kind of recalibration of its force

posture toward Asia, then if North Korea continues to go in the

same direction and we cannot find a way to work together to

resolve it, you will see more of the same and you are not going to

like it. You will see more developments such as the extension by

the ROK of the range of its missiles. You will see more developments

like the placement of TPY–2 radars in Japan. You will see

more on missile defense. You will see more on the rest of it.

And so you have some voices in China talking about, oh, well,

this is the United States trying to encircle us. It is not what we

are trying to do at all. What we are trying to do is defend ourselves.

And I think that they know these phenomena are related.

And I think that they are concerned about it and we hope it becomes

an incentive for China to step up and do a bit more, given

their special relationship with North Korea, to try to resolve this

problem. And we stand ready to work with the Chinese to do that.

We do not see signs of significant internal

dissent in North Korea, and maybe that is often the case before

changes occur. I do not know. So that presents a challenge to us

to figure out where do you drill and what do you pump into that

hole in order to engage in this kind of fracking. I love that image.

So it is tough.

I think the important thing is to keep firing on all cylinders, to

keep broadcasting into North Korea, to continue to work with our

allies who do a great deal of this work with NGOs. I do think the

situation is changing in North Korea. They are educated. They are,

I think many of them, hungry for information about what is happening

on the outside.

But when it comes to the classical stuff that we all know from

history about, well, is there a unity army or is there somebody in

the regime who is susceptible, there is nothing like that that presents

itself to us right today that we can exploit or reach out to.

And it makes it a very, very, very tough problem set.

That is really hard for me to answer. I am

not a lifelong North Korea expert.

I do not think we are going to know if and when that opportunity

necessarily presents itself any better than we have in recent years

when we have seen dramatic change in parts of the world where

there were authoritarian or dictatorial systems. And the problem

with North Korea is it is just the most hermetically sealed, highwalled,

paranoid state out there. I do not think it really has its

modern equivalent anywhere else in the world.

Maybe Albania.

Maybe Albania.

So I have to admit that even though a lot of very dedicated,

qualified people work this issue in the intelligence community, in

our military, out of the State Department, and we do that on a

daily basis, there is not anything there that I can point to right

now as the pressure point, the fissure that we can exploit.

I keep coming back to the necessity for staying true to our principles,

staying close to our allies, working hard with our partners,

in particular China given their relationship, highlighting the

human rights depredations in North Korea. And I believe that

there will come a day when things will likely change. I do not think

that North Korea has forever to make the strategic choice to go in

a different direction that will involve reaching out to the rest of the

world and fulfilling its promises and going down the path of

denuclearization. That is it. They have got an off-ramp. There is a

way that we can work this peacefully, diplomatically that we presented

to them time and time again, and they have chosen not to

take us up on it. We will continue to do it, and some day, I am

convinced, when the pounds per square inch of pressure builds up

enough, they may see the light and decide, well, maybe we ought

to take door No. 1. I hope that is true.

That is a great question. We work at it all

the time. There have been some successes. I mean, you are familiar

with the Burma example where the new government has made the

strategic decision to go in a different direction and to change the

nature of its relationship with North Korea. That is very important.

That will still take some time to play out and work through.

The same is true of many of these other sort of traditional customers

or states that have dealt with North Korea. Since the

al-Kibar reactor was taken care of in Syria, I think that is a relationship

that is no longer what it was.

So the truth is we take it case by case. We work with these countries

that still maintain an arms relationship with North Korea. I

think this effort to expand the international coalition and consensus

about North Korea is important because the moral hazard

of dealing with North Korea becomes a more important factor, I

think, for many of these countries. But I guess the short and honest

answer is it is a case-by-case effort that we undertake and we

are seeking to step it up. And this resolution passed today in New

York I think is going to help us, to a great extent, to get at that

problem.

Well, here I can draw on my couple of years

working at the International Atomic Energy Agency where in the

wake of the President’s Prague speech where he set out his vision

for a world without nuclear weapons, I found, representing the

United States in that body, a 150-nation body, that that had a tremendous

effect on convincing a lot of the fence-sitters around the

world that the United States was serious about trying to move forward

because if you go back to Eisenhower’s nuclear bargain,

which he laid out in his Atoms for Peace speech, you know, it was

quite clear. Those with nuclear weapons would seek over time to—

you know the whole thing—get rid of them. Those without would

pledge not to acquire them. And so for many, many, many countries

in the world, the United States demonstrating that it is serious

about keeping up its end of the nuclear bargain has a tremendous

effect.

Now, when it comes to North Korea, I am not going to spin you

and tell you that the North Koreans are going to pack up their

nuclear weapons and put them in a pile and burn them up if we

pass further arms control treaties with Russia and so forth. But

what it does is it has a tremendous effect on all 189 nations who

are signatories of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and it makes it

easier for us and others who care a lot about this treaty to move

that agenda forward, reduces North Korea’s running room, makes

it tougher for North Korea to continue to claim that they need

these weapons in order to defend themselves. And so I think it is

a vital aspect of winning over hearts and minds globally and eventually

setting up a set of circumstances in which it is very, very

difficult if not, one hopes, eventually impossible for them to continue

to maintain as an international outlier this commitment to

develop nuclear weapons.

Well, I think actually the policy has more

commonalities than differences. In both cases what we seek to do

is, as I said earlier, in the case of North Korea, use pressure when

we have to use pressure and seek to exploit engagement when it

is possible to engage them.

I do not agree that there has been no change. I think that the

pressure of the sanctions, the coalitions we have built, the work in

six-party, a lot of the diplomatic efforts in which the gentlemen to

my right who will testify next were intimately involved went a

great distance to——

Well, I think we have two very different

historical situations that have developed, and I think it is because

of the different set of circumstances in both. I am not an Iran

expert. I worked the issue when I was in Vienna, but that was

some time ago. So I can quickly get myself in trouble by trying to

compare the Iran case to the North Korea case.

But as the North Korea case has developed, I think that there

have been some successes. I think we have slowed their efforts to

create these weapons. I think we have built this coalition that is

going to continue to decrease their running room and their space

within which they can operate. I have faith that if we stick with

our principles that have been devised on a bipartisan basis over

20–30 years, that we will see the kinds of changes that we would

like to see.

And I am sorry. It is true. You know, these are pernicious problems.

This is the land of a lot of bad alternatives. And so I think

the way you deal with it is you stick to your principles. You stick

to your allies. You make modest progress here, sometimes dramatic

progress there. Occasionally there are setbacks, but you keep at it.

And I think American leadership on this issue is absolutely essential.

I think it has borne a lot of fruit. Sadly it has not changed

the strategic situation yet, but I have got every confidence that if

we keep at it, if we keep together, we are going to see sooner or

later—hope it is sooner—the kinds of changes we hope are needed.

And I want to reemphasize this one point. It is up to North

Korea to understand that it has another path that it can take. It

has a partner in the international community that will engage with

North Korea, but it has got to be the one to make this decision,

make this strategic choice, move toward abandoning nuclear weapons

and missiles. And if they do, there can be a very different

future on the Korean Peninsula and one that will be for the benefit

of all the Korean people, North and South.

You have to be on North Korea.